Berkshire Hathaway 2002 Annual Report Download - page 72

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71
Better yet, this funding to date has been cost-free. Deferred tax liabilities bear no interest. And as long as
we can break even in our insurance underwriting — which we have done, on the average, during our 32
years in the business — the cost of the float developed from that operation is zero. Neither item, of course,
is equity; these are real liabilities. But they are liabilities without covenants or due dates attached to them.
In effect, they give us the benefit of debt — an ability to have more assets working for us — but saddle us
with none of its drawbacks.
Of course, there is no guarantee that we can obtain our float in the future at no cost. But we feel our
chances of attaining that goal are as good as those of anyone in the insurance business. Not only have we
reached the goal in the past (despite a number of important mistakes by your Chairman), our 1996
acquisition of GEICO, materially improved our prospects for getting there in the future.
8. A managerial "wish list" will not be filled at shareholder expense. We will not diversify by purchasing
entire businesses at control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to our shareholders. We
will only do with your money what we would do with our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by
diversifying your own portfolios through direct purchases in the stock market.
Charlie and I are interested only in acquisitions that we believe will raise the per-share intrinsic value of
Berkshire's stock. The size of our paychecks or our offices will never be related to the size of Berkshire's
balance sheet.
9. We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results. We test the wisdom of retaining
earnings by assessing whether retention, over time, delivers shareholders at least $1 of market value for
each $1 retained. To date, this test has been met. We will continue to apply it on a five-year rolling basis.
As our net worth grows, it is more difficult to use retained earnings wisely.
We continue to pass the test, but the challenges of doing so have grown more difficult. If we reach the
point that we can't create extra value by retaining earnings, we will pay them out and let our shareholders
deploy the funds.
10. We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in business value as we give. This rule applies
to all forms of issuance — not only mergers or public stock offerings, but stock-for-debt swaps, stock
options, and convertible securities as well. We will not sell small portions of your company — and that is
what the issuance of shares amounts to — on a basis inconsistent with the value of the entire enterprise.
When we sold the Class B shares in 1996, we stated that Berkshire stock was not undervalued — and some
people found that shocking. That reaction was not well-founded. Shock should have registered instead had
we issued shares when our stock was undervalued. Managements that say or imply during a public offering
that their stock is undervalued are usually being economical with the truth or uneconomical with their
existing shareholders' money: Owners unfairly lose if their managers deliberately sell assets for 80¢ that in
fact are worth $1. We didn't commit that kind of crime in our offering of Class B shares and we never will.
(We did not, however, say at the time of the sale that our stock was overvalued, though many media have
reported that we did.)
11. You should be fully aware of one attitude Charlie and I share that hurts our financial performance:
Regardless of price, we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that Berkshire owns. We are
also very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and
as long as we feel good about their managers and labor relations. We hope not to repeat the capital-
allocation mistakes that led us into such sub-par businesses. And we react with great caution to
suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to satisfactory profitability by major capital
expenditures. (The projections will be dazzling and the advocates sincere, but, in the end, major additional
investment in a terrible industry usually is about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.) Nevertheless,
gin rummy managerial behavior (discard your least promising business at each turn) is not our style. We
would rather have our overall results penalized a bit than engage in that kind of behavior.
We continue to avoid gin rummy behavior. True, we closed our textile business in the mid-1980's after 20
years of struggling with it, but only because we felt it was doomed to run never-ending operating losses.
We have not, however, given thought to selling operations that would command very fancy prices nor have
we dumped our laggards, though we focus hard on curing the problems that cause them to lag.